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Losing the peace: Euroscepticism and
the foundations of contemporary
English nationalism
BEN WELLINGS
The Australian National University, Australia
ABSTRACT. Political resistance to European integration in the UK laid important
ideological foundations for contemporary English nationalism. The politics surround-
ing accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) was such that it signalled
that accession was a matter of supreme national importance and, via the device of a
referendum, it led to the fusing of parliamentary and popular sovereignty. The
unfolding of the Thatcherite project in Britain added an individualistic – and
eventually an anti-European – dimension to this nascent English nationalism.
Resistance to the deepening political and monetary integration of Europe, coupled
with the effects of devolution in the UK, led to the emergence of a populist English
nationalism, by now fundamentally shaped by opposition to European integration,
albeit a nationalism that merged the defence of British and English sovereignty.
Underpinning these three developments was a popular version of the past that saw
‘Europe’ as the ultimate institutional expression of British decline. Thus Euroscepeti-
cism generated the ideology of contemporary English nationalism by legitimising the
defence of parliamentary sovereignty through the invocation of popular sovereignty
underpinned by reference to the past.
KEYWORDS: England, Euroscepticism, nationalism, populism, sovereignty
Introduction
They key to understanding the apparent absence of English nationalism is not
to search too long for anything that expresses itself as distinctively English in
the realm of politics. This is because a central element in English nationalism
is the defence of sovereignty – that is, the defence of the UK’s sovereignty.
Certainly there are some minor campaigns that seek to redress the asymmetric
devolution of the UK, but the ideology of English nationalism is not
generated in the main by this sort of resentment. Although devolution played
an important part in creating the structural conditions necessary to imagine
England as a distinct political community, what we might best consider as
contemporary English nationalism is generated by opposition to European
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integration. By defending the UK’s sovereignty against the encroaching
powers of the European Union (EU), English nationalists often obscure
English nationalism by defending Britain. This is not to say that English
nationalism is necessarily ‘quiescent’ or even ‘non-existent’ or that people in
England don’t identify themselves as ‘English’, but rather that opposition to
European integration has informed and illuminated nationalism in England
for over forty years, providing the ideological content for the most organised
expression of contemporary English nationalism.
The argument that follows consists of three pillars, resting on a fourth
foundation:
1. The politics surrounding accession to the Common Market was such that it
signalled that accession was a matter of supreme national importance and –
via the device of a referendum – led to the fusing of parliamentary and
popular sovereignty.
2. The unfolding of the Thatcherite project in Britain added an individualistic
and eventually an anti-European dimension to a nascent English nationalism.
3. Resistance to the deepening political and monetary integration of Europe,
coupled with the effects of devolution in the UK, led to the emergence of a
populist English nationalism, by now fundamentally shaped by opposition
to European integration.
4. Underpinning the development and articulation of this anti-European
ideology was a popular version of the past that saw ‘Europe’ as the
ultimate institutional expression of British and English decline.
The overall conclusion derived from the above is that political resistance to
European integration laid important ideological foundations for contemporary
English nationalism. It did this by legitimising the defence of parliamentary
sovereignty through the invocation of popular sovereignty, popularly under-
stood by reference to England’s past.
This emphasis on the ideological origins and construction of English
nationalism differs from many recent approaches to Englishness. Political
attention to English nationalism has been driven by the so-called ‘English’ or
‘West Lothian’ question: what sort of political powers should be accorded to
England in an asymmetrically devolved UK? At a popular level, this question
seems to have been met with equanimity (see Susan Condor in this issue for an
analysis of English reactions to devolution). Explanations for this seeming
quiescence are varied. They range from research demonstrating that there is
an active hostility to English identity among the young (Fenton 2007); to the
notion that England is imagined as a void or absence (Abell et al. 2007); or
that English nationalism exists but dare not speak its name (McCrone 2006);
or that it exists but is politically weak (Bryant 2008) and even to the notion
that England is actually dead (Scruton 2001). Each of these explanations has
merit – some more than others – yet many of these studies focus on what we
might call English identity as opposed to English nationalism. Kumar alone
seeks to address the content of English nationalism, only to conclude that
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there never was anything resembling English nationalism until recently,
thereby inhibiting the development of an English national consciousness
(Kumar 2003). Anthony Smith has called for a longer-term historical analysis
of English nationalism in the context of European unity (Smith 2006), and this
is an area that certainly needs to be explored further. Only Gifford has
examined the relationship between Euroscepticism and populism, but with an
emphasis on Britain and its political economy (Gifford 2008). As I will argue,
resistance to European integration has laid the ideological foundations of a
contemporary English nationalism by legitimising the defence of parliamen-
tary sovereignty through the invocation of popular sovereignty.
However, with one or two minor exceptions such as the Campaign for an
English Parliament (CEP), the ideology of contemporary English nationalism is
not explicitly borne by an understanding of politics, but is instead carried
implicitly in an understanding of the past. An analysis of the role that arguments
about the past – and lessons to be learned from them – played in resistance to
European integration highlight the links between contemporary English nation-
alism and Euroscepticism. But the dominant understanding of the past in
England is a vision of history where the notion of ‘greatness’ has been torpedoed
by perceptions of ‘decline’ in the post-War era – and ‘Europe’ can be all too
easily seen as the institutional expression of this fall from great power status.
I
Debates about accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in the
1960s and 1970s (see, for example, Dewey 2009; Her Majesty’s Government
1971) laid the foundations for the contemporary resurgence in English
nationalism in two important ways. Firstly, they rehearsed arguments about
the defence of parliamentary sovereignty, whose continuity and importance
could not truly be understood by ‘continentals’. Secondly, they fused the
notion of parliamentary sovereignty with that of popular sovereignty through
the device of a referendum.
This is not to say that other considerations did not contribute to a sceptical
attitude towards European integration prior to the 1970s. Some of these
objections were based on nothing more than prejudice and hearsay. In a draft
pamphlet entitled Into the EEC?, businessman A. G. Elliot argued against
joining the EEC on the following grounds:
I visited France on a 2,000 mile business trip and everywhere (except among the
peasants) I found half the companies and people I dealt with tried to cheat me. As a
recent television programme proved this sort of thing does not happen to foreign
visitors to England . . . and while I have spoken about the French, people tell me
Italians are worse.(Letter/pamphlet from A. G. Elliot to Shore, SHORE/9/44 (Mis-
cellaneous 1971))
Such attitudes cannot be dismissed lightly, because we know that ‘othering’
plays an important part in the generation of collective identities (Cohen 1991:
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197). However, this mechanism is not speciﬁc to the English and was far less
conspicuous at the level of parliamentary and political organisation around the
issue of the UK’s accession to the EEC where other issues were more important.
Britain’s enduring ties to the empire and commonwealth were an obvious
countervailing pull away from closer economic and political integration with
countries of the European mainland. This was particularly true of Prime
Minister Harold Wilson, who after Labour’s general election victories of 1974
found himself at the head of a government reluctantly committed to a
referendum on the renegotiated terms of Britain’s involvement in the EEC.
Indeed, Europe was something of a mystery to Wilson. Bernard Donnoghue,
one of Wilson’s policy advisors, felt that Wilson was ‘basically a north of
England, non-conformist, puritan . . . the continental Europeans, especially
from France and southern Europe were to him alien. He disliked their rich
food, genuinely preferring meat and two veg with HP sauce’ (cited in
Hennessy 2001: 365). Speaking to the London Labour Mayors’ Association
in 1974, Wilson argued that Britain’s ties to the commonwealth were not
merely a matter of sugar and butter:
There are deep personal and family relationships for many of our people with countries in
the Commonwealth. I have 43 close relatives in Australia, descendents of my four
grandparents, more than four times as many as I have in Britain. I am not unique in this.
And in addition to family ties there are very many who recall the response of the
Commonwealth when Europe’s freedom was in danger, many who developed close
personal friendships in the Commonwealth. I trust that our friends in the Community will
not underrate this powerful feeling in Britain, or the importance of the Commonwealth
relationship which we can bring into the Community with us. (Wilson 1974)
For Wilson, Europe was equated with danger and threat, while the common-
wealth was a source of succor, and one made real through ties of family and
friendship. And the anxieties about loss ﬂowed in both directions – particu-
larly from New Zealand, which was set to be the biggest commonwealth loser
if and when the UK joined the EEC. A pamphlet written in 1971 by Tom
Weal of the New Zealand Common Market Safeguards Campaign bore the
famous picture of St Paul’s during the blitz superimposed on a union ﬂag on
its front cover. The tone of the pamphlet was apocalyptic:
Together we stand at the crossroads of history. The SECOND BATTLE OF
BRITAIN is imminent. In the mystical sense, am I to be that stranger from New
Zealand standing on a broken arch of London Bridge to gaze upon the ruins of St
Paul’s? (Weal 1971)
But while these commonwealth ties were important in the 1960s and 1970s,
they were not crucial in the emergence of a speciﬁcally English nationalism. Of
more lasting importance was the defence of parliamentary sovereignty and its
fusion with popular sovereignty through the referendum of June 1975. Its was
the prospect of the UK’s entry into the EEC that forced members of the
public and the political class alike to think about the ways in which they were
governed. The last time people were forced to do this was during World War
II – and now there was the real prospect of close economic integration with
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some of the very powers that had fought against Britain. The greatest political
resistance to European integration came from the Labour Party; at this stage,
the Conservatives and the Liberals were pro-Europe. Debate about accession to
the EEC was initially focused around the passing of the European Communities
Act in October 1971. Writing in that year, Ron Leighton, director of the Labour
Party’s Committee for Safeguards on the Common Market, spelt out the fears
of the left about the EEC. While some of the objections related to left-wing
suspicion of the EEC as being pro-big business, the twin themes of sovereignty
and history emerged too. ‘Sovereignty,’ argued Leighton, ‘is not a reactionary
concept. It is our most precious possession, as those countries in the world
without it today would testify’ (Leighton 1971: 13). But sovereignty could not be
understood in isolation from history. Leighton continued:
Our present liberties and freedoms in Britain were fought for and achieved by our
forefathers in a long struggle which included such milestones as Magna Carta, the Bill of
Rights, the Chartist movement, the various reform bills, women’s suffrage, and so on.
Our present MPs have inherited these rights and liberties, and now they are custodians
responsible for handing them on to future generations. They certainly have no mandate
to surrender or abandon our right to self-government and self-determination to the
apparatus in Brussels and would never be forgiven for doing so. (Leighton 1971: 13)
When PrimeMinster Ted Heath duly signed the Treaty of Rome in 1972 and the
UK acceded to the EEC the following year, the novel issue of a popular
referendum was placed on the political agenda by the so-called ‘anti-marketeers’
in the Labour Party. It was this device that began the fusion of parliamentary
and popular sovereignty on the issue of Europe. The anti-marketeers were
drawn predominantly, but not exclusively, from the left wing of the Labour
Party. Having lost the battle over accession on the ﬂoor of the Commons, this
group, led by the likes of Peter Shore, Tony Benn and Barbara Castle,
campaigned to make a referendum on the EEC Labour policy. This policy
was broadly supported by party members and MPs, but would prove difﬁcult
for the leadership when Labour came to power in 1974. But as Anthony Forster
pointed out, the notion of popular sovereignty inherent in a referendum sits
strangely with the defence of parliamentary sovereignty, which was the
ostensible goal of the anti-marketeers (Forster 2002: 92). Nevertheless, a
referendum on continued UK involvement under renegotiated terms of acces-
sion was part of the Labour manifesto in both elections of 1974, and after their
second victory of that year a date for a referendum was duly set for 6 June 1975.
However, it was the outspoken former Conservative MP Enoch Powell who
made some of the most explicit links between national identity and sovereignty
during the referendum campaign. Speaking on Radio Three in the run-up to the
referendum, Powell – already habituated to defending the English people’s
sovereignty against new commonwealth immigrants – argued that ‘parliamen-
tary sovereignty is the form in which we are accustomed to asserting our
national independence’, adding that parliamentary sovereignty was also ‘the fact
for which men have fought and died, that the laws in their country are made
only by the institutions of their country and in Britain that they are made only
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by the parliamentary institutions of our country’ (Powell 1975). And even
though many of the arguments on the left stemmed from a sceptical attitude
towards the EEC’s capitalist and Christian Democratic credentials, even ﬁgures
such as Tony Benn could comprehend the EEC’s lack of appeal in Britain
through an understanding of the inviolability of Britain’s borders since 1066 and
portray it as a recreation of the Holy Roman Empire (Benn 1971).
What emerged stronger out of these debates during the ﬁrst half of the
1970s was an understanding of Englishness founded upon and articulated
around a sense of the uniqueness of parliament, as well as its historical
formation, longevity and continuity throughout the travails of the twentieth
century. This continuity could not be understood by continental Europeans
who, in the words of the anti-market National Referendum Campaign, were
‘more used to giving up their institutions than we are’ (National Referendum
Campaign 1975: 5). These understandings of England’s past were turned into
a populist issue by the referendum of 1975. This unusual innovation in British
politics was ostensibly to allow the people to decide this issue of supreme
national importance. However, it was also designed to preserve the Labour
Party from splitting over the issue of Europe (Hennessy 2001: 365). In short,
Prime Minister Wilson was far more concerned with Labour unity than
European unity. Thus to keep the government together the electorate found
itself confronted with arguments that were presented as being of such national
signiﬁcance that only ‘the people’ could decide. The anti-marketeers failed in
their objective of securing Britain’s withdrawal from the EEC, losing the
referendum in June 1975 by a margin of almost two to one (Blair 2005: 47).
Ultimately, the anti-marketeers’ key argument that the referendum was about
‘whether or not we remain free to rule ourselves in our own way’ (National
Referendum Campaign 1975: 2) did not carry as much force as the govern-
ment-backed campaign for a Yes vote, which downplayed the threat to
sovereignty and emphasised material concerns:
Today we are even more dependent on what happens outside. Our trade, our jobs, our
food, our defence cannot wholly be within our own control. That is why so much of the
argument about sovereignty is a false one . . . If we came out the Community would go
on taking decisions which affect us vitally – but we should have no say in them. We
would be clinging to the shadow of British sovereignty while its substance ﬂies out of the
window. [Emphases in original] (Britain in Europe 1975: 4)
And in a Britain where memories of wartime want still lingered, arguments
about basic material prosperity – ‘Britain, as a country which cannot feed
itself, will be safer in the Community which is almost self-sufﬁcient in food’ –
were persuasive (Britain in Europe 1975: 6).
Nevertheless, these debates of the early 1970s gave political salience to a
popular version of national identity linked to parliamentary sovereignty. But
there was a caveat: parliament’s sovereignty extended beyond the borders of
England, a legacy of the UK’s political development that helped conﬂate and
confuse England and Britain. With England being what Arthur Aughey has
termed ‘an absorptive patria’ (Aughey 2007), Englishness and Britishness
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were still commonly merged. It would take a further intensiﬁcation of anti-
European attitudes, plus the strengthening of nationalisms in other parts of
Britain, to begin to disentangle English nationalism from the defence of
British sovereignty.
II
The Conservative Party’s weakening commitment to European integration is
well documented. As Andrew Geddes points out, Conservative support for
Europe was predicated on a ‘rather narrow trade-based idea of European
integration that was unlikely to be adaptable to the ambitious programmes for
political and economic integration which were launched in the 1980s’ (Geddes
2004: 192). Margaret Thatcher campaigned for a Yes vote in 1975, and although
European affairs in the initial ﬁve years of her time as prime minister were
dominated by the budget rebate, this was a difference of detail (admittedly one
worth millions of pounds) rather than principle. Indeed, with the Single
European Act (SEA) of 1987, it looked as if the Conservative Party was doing
much to remake the European Community (EC) in Britain’s new-found neo-
liberal image. But the origins of what was now being dubbed ‘Euroscepticism’
can be found in Thatcher’s attempts to change the Conservative Party and
Britain from 1975 onwards. As with Labour’s referendum in 1975, domestic
concerns ultimately generated important attitudes towards European integra-
tion, and again a concern with British sovereignty arose in the face of the process
of European integration. In asserting and defending British sovereignty,
Thatcher not only hardened and deepened a split within the Conservative
Party, but also deepened national divisions within the UK itself.
In her attempt to radicalise and modernise both the Conservative Party
and Britain, the EEC initially seemed to be on the right side of history for
Thatcher. The past – especially the Victorian era – was never a foreign country
for Margaret Thatcher; in fact the past was Britain. But it was a past that
served as an inspiration for contemporary renewal. ‘The time is ripe for a new
radicalism’, argued Thatcher to her Party in 1977, but she cautioned that her
version of the past was not nostalgic, nor an attempt to turn back the clock to
Britain’s imperial heyday:
On the contrary, we are trying to start the clock up again, to move forward with
Europe. This is not going back to the nineteenth century, but trying to restore the
economic and social momentum we had in the nineteenth century and adapt it to
present needs.(Thatcher 1977a)
Negative attitudes towards European integration ultimately developed out of
the ‘battle of ideas’ over the relationship between the state and individual in
Britain, which were only latterly applied to the development of the EC.
Thatcher outlined some of her early ideas – with the help of Sir Keith Joseph
and the Centre for Policy Studies – in opposition during 1977. The idea that
‘government should step in and replace organic and spontaneous relation-
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ships by regimentation from above’, argued Thatcher, ‘was alien to the Anglo-
Saxon tradition’. She continued with her historical analysis of the role of the
state in European history:
The absolute monarchs which emerged in some European countries out of the feudal
order considered it their duty to regulate and initiate. If they did not encourage
commerce and manufacture – they believed there would be none. They never stopped
to ask themselves whether their heavy hand did not in fact inhibit spontaneous growth.
(Thatcher 1977b)
All of this was designed to win over the Party and electorate to the neo-liberal
ideas and, like Wilson’s attitude towards Europe, was essentially driven by
domestic concerns. Importantly, the notion of individual sovereignty was
from this point on added to the popular defence of parliamentary sovereignty
initiated in the 1970s. From May 1979, the Conservative Party sought to turn
Thatcherite ideals into political and social reality. With such an emphasis on
the individual, it might have seemed as if the link between a putative
nationalism and the institutions of state would weaken, but this was not the
case. As far back as 1977, The Times noted that ‘Mrs Thatcher’s assumptions
are individualist and her individualism belongs to the English protestant
Christian tradition’ (The Times, 5 July 1977). But the rhetoric of ‘putting the
Great back in Britain’ for a long time obscured the Englishness of Thatcher-
ism – at least in England. But the distinction between Britain and the ‘historic
nations’ of the UK was always easier to make outside of its English core. In
Scotland in particular, the distinction became more acute as the 1980s wore
on. Andrew Marr noted that:
What became known as Thatcherism was viscerally and intellectually opposed to the
post-War Scottish consensus, characterised by the domination of the public sector and
quasi-socialist tone in public life generally. With its mass public housing, high union
membership and struggling heavy industries, Scotland was a lot like England, only
more so. But its subtly different intellectual and political climate made it much more
resistant to the politics, if not the policies, of Thatcherism. (Marr 1995: 168)
From 1987, Scottish opinion formers and the electorate began to move away
from the Conservative Party. Responding to this growing disaffection, the
Scottish Constitutional Convention issued a Claim of Right, arguing that ‘we
have a government which openly boasts its contempt for consensus and a
constitution which allows it to demonstrate that contempt in practice’
(Constitutional Steering Group 1988: 23). So the problem was not just
Thatcherism and the Conservative Party alone, but Britain too. The Cam-
paign for a Scottish Assembly endorsed the idea that ‘the United Kingdom is
a political artifact put together at English insistence. If it is to continue, it
must work for its living and justify its existence’ (Constitutional Steering
Group 1988: 6). The Community Charge (or Poll Tax), initiated in Scotland
one year ahead of the rest of the UK, fuelled anti-Conservatism and anti-
Englishness (the two concepts being treated as almost synonymous).
While the Scots were chiselling Englishness out of the Conservative
rhetoric of Britishness, changes to the EC pushed the issue of sovereignty –
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Parliamentary and popular – back to the centre of political debate. The logic
of Thatcherism’s individualistic anti-bureaucratism ﬁnally played out in the
Bruges speech of September 1988 (Thatcher 1988). In this, speech Thatcher
was concerned to halt the erosion of national and individual liberty by what
she saw as an encroaching, alien power. Her subsequent views on the
development of the EC reveal not only the manifest superiority of the British
system of government – ‘if I were an Italian, I might prefer rule from Brussels
too’ (Thatcher 1995: 742) – but also the linking of the British way of life and
national character with those very institutions of government, worrying the
prime minister that ‘British democracy, parliamentary sovereignty, the
common law, our traditional sense of fairness, our ability to run our own
affairs in our own way’ might be ‘subordinated to a remote European
bureaucracy, resting on very different traditions’ (Thatcher 1995: 743).
Further developments within the member states of the EC during the late
1980s, notably German reuniﬁcation, also revealed and contributed to a conﬂa-
tion of xenophobia and Eurosceptic ideas. Margaret Thatcher’s meeting to
discuss the German national character at Chequers in March 1990 and Nicholas
Ridley’s description of the EC as a ‘German racket’ illustrated suspicions still
resting on the experience of ﬁghting Germany during the twentieth century
(Ramsden 2006: 405). According to Thatcher, since 1871 Germany had been
veering ‘unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt’, and containing post-
War Germany within the framework of European unity was not a way to solve
‘the German problem’ but was only bound to exacerbate it (Thatcher 1995: 791).
The worst-case scenario for Thatcher was a reuniﬁed Germany in a strengthened
EC (Volkery 2009). But even if Thatcher was somewhat isolated in her attitudes,
as the decade closed, the tendency within the Conservative Party to view the EC
as a threatening alignment of former foes grew stronger. The European threat to
parliament’s sovereignty appeared to threaten the very warp and weft of popular
life, as the regulation and harmonisation required to create the single market
impacted on the UK and was reported in the press in greater measure.
When Thatcher was ousted as Conservative leader in November 1990, the
leadership challenge was precipitated by divisions over the issue of Europe.
But despite the efforts of the pro-European wing of the Conservative Party to
ameliorate the anti-European sentiments now commonplace in the Party,
those ideas had set down ﬁrm roots. This left the new prime minister, John
Major, to deal with a large and vociferous Eurosceptic bloc in the Party, just
at the moment when the political project of European Union was being
negotiated at Maastricht. And the issue of Europe continued to tear the
Conservative Party apart during Major’s full term as Prime Minister, between
1992 and 1997. Again, the past was never very far beneath the surface of the
debate on Europe, and the language was set in terms that recalled the wartime
threat to Britain from Nazi Germany and its quisling allies. Paul Johnson
wrote in The Spectator that ‘what the row over the Maastricht Treaty has
brought to the surface is the salient fact that Britain’s real enemy is not
Germany but France’, where among the small number of politicians and
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fonctionnaires ‘hatred of Britain and the individual freedom it stands for is a
religion’ (Johnson 1992). In language ironically resembling those in favour of
a devolved Scottish parliament, Conservative Eurosceptics spoke out against
the erosion of democracy entailed by being an under-represented and poorly
understood part of a centralising political union. Thus the process of
European integration heightened a sense of distinctiveness around the issue
of sovereignty. Writing in The European Journal, the publication of the
Eurosceptic European Foundation, Stephen Hill elaborated a divide between
Britons and Germans in relation to sovereignty, the law and rights, attitudes
that had become habits of mind:
. . . Our constitution (which has evolved continuously for 781 years) is in an unwritten
form and depends on duties. Our monarch is surrounded by an aura of mystery that
reﬂects the ineffable relationship between the metaphysical Form of Sovereignty and
the manifest sovereign. In Britain, we believe our liberty is protected in the belief of the
Idea of Liberty itself . . . Germans believe the exact opposite. They accept that law is
made by the president of the people and is worked out in advance and is written down.
Similarly, the constitution (they are on their ﬁfth in 125 years) must be written down.
Their liberty, as they see it, is protected by their ‘Basic Rights’ enshrined in a legal
code.(Hill 1996: 13)
Worse still, Eurosceptics believed that this un-English conception of political
rights and freedoms was about to be imposed on England via the EU. Ahead
of the 1996 Inter-governmental Conference, leading Eurosceptics Bill Cash
and Iain Duncan Smith accused Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
advocating ‘a system of authoritarian and bureaucratic European government
which would extinguish the opportunity to disagree’ (Cash and Duncan Smith
1996: 39), precisely the curtailment of liberty that had been averted between
1939 and 1945. This fear of German hegemony remained based on a view of
European history: ‘German fear of its past and other nations’ fear of
Germany is not a secure base for a balanced operation in Europe’, claimed
Cash and Duncan Smith, who argued that ‘the German problem’ had the
potential to ‘destabilise Europe and the world well into the next millennium’
(Cash and Duncan Smith 1996: 39).
By 1996, this attitude of seeing Anglo–European relations in terms of a
particular view of the past had become so ingrained that most signiﬁcant Anglo–
European interactions were characterised as conﬂicts. This was particularly true
in terms of the 1996 ‘Beef War’ and the tabloid coverage of Euro96. The debates
about European integration of the late 1980s and the 1990s had deepened
the association made between the nation, the past and the defence of sover-
eignty. It also added a dose of English individualism to the mix, allowing for
the development of criticisms of the EU as a constraint on liberty, not as in the
European understanding of the past, its guarantor. Again, given the emphasis
on defending parliament’s sovereignty from the seemingly federalist direction of
European integration, it was still too easy to equate England and Britain and
treat these two entities as synonymous. But although the content and contours
of this nascent nationalism were emerging, the speciﬁc Englishness of this
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Euroscepticism was not yet evident to all south of the Tweed and east of the
Severn. Nevertheless, by the time of the fall of Major’s Conservative government
in 1997, the intellectual framework for an English nationalism based around
Euroscpeticism was in place.
III
When New Labour came to power in 1997, one of their ﬁrst and most
signiﬁcant actions was to devolve power to Scotland, Wales, London and –
eventually – Northern Ireland. The only attempt to create a devolved regional
assembly in England – in the north-east in 2004 – was a resounding failure.
But in the late 1990s, the asymmetrically devolved structure of the UK began
to produce a sort of English resentment nationalism of the type outlined by
Liah Greenfeld (1992). Philip Resnick has referred to this type of nationalism
as one characterised by ‘hubris’ – ‘an overweening pride in one’s own national
community’ usually found in the national majorities of formerly imperial
states; an attitude that he contrasts with the ‘melancholy’ of national
minorities (Resnick 2008: 789–90). In England, the ideological content of
a putative English nationalism had already formed around Euroscepticism,
or at least Euroscepticism was broad enough to accommodate the opinions
of those who resented bureaucratic regulation, open borders and foreign
erosion of the UK’s sovereignty – all understood as ‘national decline’. The
expression of that ideology might best be summed up by combining Resnick’s
two descriptors and concluding that English nationalism in the early twenty-
ﬁrst century could be described as ‘hubristically melancholic’, where a
nostalgia for the past combined with an increasingly organised and popular
anti-European politics.
In January 1998, four months after the successful referenda establishing
devolution in Scotland and Wales, a private member’s bill on the creation of
an English parliament was tabled by Teresa Gorman MP. Gorman was a
prominent Eurosceptic, one of the so-called ‘Euro rebels’ who had lost the
whip in 1995 over the issue of the UK’s ﬁnancial contribution to the EU.
Gorman might be described at this time as ‘reluctantly English’: she had no
particular desire to see the UK divided up into its national constituents,
fearing that this might make the UK easier to govern from Brussels’ point of
view, but she felt that devolution had changed things. Gorman stated that
despite calling for an English parliament, she was in fact a unionist. But New
Labour’s policies had forced her hand and she demanded that the English
receive ‘fair and equal treatment’, noting in passing that nine out of the twenty
ministers in Blair’s Cabinet were Scottish or Welsh, or represented Scottish
or Welsh constituencies (Hansards, 16 January 1998: col. 596). In those years
immediately prior to the establishment of a parliament in Scotland and
an assembly in Wales, G. K. Chesterton’s lines about the people of England
who have not spoken yet were given a good dusting off. Indeed, scholarly and
r The authors 2010. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2010
498 Ben Wellings
popular interest in England and the English increased (see, for example,
Jeremy Paxman’s 1998 bestseller, The English). But while the Conservative
Part grappled with the pros and cons of establishing an English parliament
after 1997, New Labour, with signiﬁcant constituencies of support in Scot-
land, Wales and the urban centres of England, became the new unionists, and
developed notions of ‘inclusive’ Britishness as a counterpoint to what they
portrayed as the ‘exclusive’ Englishness of the Conservatives (see, for
example, Gordon Brown in Prospect, April 2005). There was one sense in
which the Conservatives were exclusively English: their parliamentary repre-
sentation at Westminster was conﬁned exclusively to England between 1997
and 2001. The election of 1997 initially pushed the two major parties further
apart on the issue of Europe too. The Conservatives deepened their Euro-
sceptic stance and in their party leaders, William Hague and Iain Duncan
Smith, they had two Eurosceptic champions.
At ﬁrst, the contrast between the Conservatives and New Labour could not
have been starker. After the long years of Conservative Euroscepticism, New
Labour seemed like a breath of fresh air blowing in from the Channel. During
its period of ‘modernisation’ in the 1980s and 1990s, the Labour Party
dropped its 1983 manifesto pledge to withdraw from the EEC. Additionally,
as the EC under Commission President Jacques Delors began to regulate
and harmonise its way towards the single market, its aims and objectives
began to chime with a Labour Party itself reforming towards a ‘middle’ or
‘third’ way. Blair himself was the most ‘European’ of all the Prime Ministers
since Heath, and early on in his ﬁrst term of ofﬁce he addressed the Assemble´e
Nationale in French (it would be hard to image Wilson, Callaghan, Thatcher
or Major being able to pronounce rosbif let alone conduct a whole speech in
another language). During New Labour’s term in ofﬁce, there were attempts
to contain narratives of Britain’s past in a European framework, but
ultimately the search for greatness emphasised the fact that past grandeur
seemed unobtainable either within the context of European integration or as
America’s junior partner (Gamble 2003).
Relations with European partners seemed utterly convivial at ﬁrst. Speak-
ing to Dutch dignitaries early on in his premiership, Tony Blair emphasised
the long-term strength of Anglo–Dutch relations, stating that there had been
amity between the nations for centuries despite a few ‘naval misunderstand-
ings’ (Blair 1998). Even though this was evidently a joke at the outset of his
speech, the logic of subsuming European war and conﬂict to the safety of
fraternal conﬂict also operated on large projects of commemoration – akin to
Anderson’s notion of the ‘reassurance of fratricide’ (Anderson 1991: 197). The
year 2005 marked the bicentenary of Britain’s victory over two unnamed EU
partners at the Misunderstanding of Trafalgar. Accordingly, Her Majesty
the Queen and other dignitaries assembled at Portsmouth harbour to see a
re-enactment of the famous naval disagreement between the Reds and the
Blues. In 1805, victory at Trafalgar secured the dominance of British sea
power for over a century and was marked by the construction in London of a
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huge square commemorating the victory in the 1840s. However, the 2005
commemorations at Portsmouth were one example of the dilution of Anglo-
British greatness, reinforcing the notion that Britain may have won several
wars, but it always seemed to be losing the peace.
Beneath the initial bonhomie there appeared to be a serious commitment
to British cooperation within the framework of European multilateralism, as
evidenced by the constructive attitude displayed by the new British govern-
ment during the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the St Maˆlo
Agreement concluded between Britain and France in 1998. However, Blair
was also conscious of the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the USA, and
after September 2001 demonstrated the type of Atlanticist tendencies that
appeared to vindicate all of General De Gaulle’s fears about the UK’s
involvement in Europe. This pro-American attitude, combined with the UK
government’s refusal to commit to the Euro (a signiﬁcant dimension of
European integration stymied by the threat of a popular referendum on the
matter) appeared to signal that the UK was still unwilling – or unable – to
choose between America and Europe.
It was the differing responses of the foreign ministries of Europe to the US-
led invasion of Iraq that damaged Blair’s European credentials the most and
put Britain back into the ‘awkward’ camp when it came to matters European.
The initial invasion of 2003 pitted US, British and Australian troops against
the Iraqis; and US, British and Australian governments against those of
France, Germany and Belgium. The Anglophones had support from other
European countries such as Spain, Italy, Denmark and some applicant states
such as Poland. It was this diplomatic dispute that led US Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld to divide Europe into ‘old’ and ‘new’, with Britain being in
the latter camp. But there was another way of looking at this, and that was
through the prism of a ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ Europe, with Britain deﬁnitely
‘non-core’. This idea was given its greatest popular expression by the German
philosopher Ju¨rgen Habermas and his co-writers and signatories. On 31 May
2003, Habermas and his colleagues published a series of articles in various
European newspapers (plus one in the USA) denouncing the invasion of
Iraq and thereby attempting to invoke a genuinely European public sphere,
at least within ‘core Europe’ (Habermas and Derrida 2005). Habermas
(and, somewhat passively, Derrida’s) contention was that ‘core Europe’ could
be deﬁned through what he called ‘the historical roots of a political proﬁle’: in
other words, what was distinctive about contemporary Europe – especially
in contrast to the USA – was the product of Europe’s bellicose history and
subsequent attempts to ensure that such calamities never took place again
(Habermas and Derrida 2005: 12). By this reading of history, the USA could
never understand the paciﬁc concerns that drove European integration; by
extension, Britons could not really grasp this weltanshauung either.
For Habermas, the anti-war demonstrations of 15 February 2003 were akin
to a declaration of European independence and powerfully – if somewhat
simplistically – linked the notion of ‘Europe’ with the idea of ‘peace’
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(Habermas and Derrida 2005: 10). This conception was strikingly similar to
the ideals of the European Movement of the late 1940s. One of the European
Movements’ most ardent supporters was Winston Churchill. Although
pro-Europeans in England tried to remind their compatriots of Churchill’s
pro-European sentiments, Churchill was more commonly associated with
Britain’s wartime ‘ﬁnest hour’. Indeed, by the turn of the millennium, ‘the
War’ had become symbolic of Britain’s enduring sovereignty in the face of
threats – both militaristic and paciﬁc – from continental Europe, albeit
operating in the context of considerable ignorance to the actualities of the
past (BBC News, 10 September 2000). This version of the past that privileged
Britain’s conﬂict with its continental neighbours was increasingly popularised
through ﬁlm, television, books, genealogy, commemoration and tourism
(Ramsden 2006: 363–92).
At a political level, it was still hard to discern a mass nationalism that was
explicitly English (the CEP and the English Constitutional Convention had
limited support (Bryant 2008: 670)). At a cultural level, this was less true. It
was the display of the Cross of St George at international football tourna-
ments that was the most obvious sign of this growing Englishness. This
widening of support for England was not necessarily accompanied by a
deepening of English national identity (see Abell et al. 2007; Fenton 2007).
But what the development of support for the England team did from the mid-
1990s was to allow for a mass, popular expression of an identity that was
exclusively and explicitly English rather than British; even if this identity was
‘non-political’ in the sense that it was not linked to a programme of
constitutional change. However, there were signs that, when it came to the
issue of Europe, an English nationalism that combined post-imperial mel-
ancholia with anti-European sentiment was emerging.
As noted by opinion pollsters back in 1975, most people did not vote for
the UK’s continuing involvement in the EEC out of any strong sense of
conviction, but because they felt there was no other option available to them
(Boase Massimi Pollitt Partnership 1975). This loss of what Tom Nairn has
termed ‘greatness’ – a fundamental aspect of Anglo-British identity that
required the British state to project its power throughout the world (Nairn
2002: 33) – informed much Euroscepticism. Raising concerns about Britain’s
power and freedom of action within an enlarged EU, Quinten Davies asked ‘is
the whole Union to be vetoed by Latvia or Malta?’ (Davies 1996: 23). The
latter idea was especially galling: Malta had been part of the British empire
and it was one thing to give them all the George Cross for wartime bravery,
but another to let them tell Britons what to do via the institutions of the EU.
In this sense, the EU was itself a symbol of decline and could therefore be
blamed for anything wrong with Britain, from bureaucratic waste to un-
regulated immigration. It was on just such a platform that the UK Indepen-
dence Party (UKIP) was formed, with the party articulating its ‘ﬁve
freedoms’, the principle one being freedom from the EU (UKIP 2004).
Formed in 1993 as essentially a single-issue party, UKIP’s main aim was to
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secure the UK’s withdrawal from the EU – the ultimate defence of British
sovereignty and therefore the British way of life. Two points in the creation of
a political party committed to withdrawal from the EU are worth noting. The
ﬁrst is that UKIP’s vision of the future was grounded in the past: leaving the
EU would allow Britain to become ‘a normal, self-governing democracy . . .
once again’ (UKIP 1997) and that the EU would oblige Britain ‘to abandon
the centuries old democratic and legal systems that have been embraced by
countries throughout the world’ (UKIP 2004).
Although from its name and its anti-devolutionary policies one could
conclude that this was a British party, its electoral strategies and successes –
particularly in the 2004 European elections – led to a different conclusion.
UKIP concentrated its efforts in England, and this is where all of its twelve
seats were won. Similarly, twenty-four of the Conservatives’ twenty-seven
seats won in that election were concentrated in England. Although it would be
incorrect to argue that Eurosceptic attitudes are found only in England, the
2004 elections do suggest that Euroscepticism is a bigger vote-winner in
England than in other parts of the UK. It is also interesting to contrast the
anti-European stance of this de facto English nationalist party with that of the
Scottish National Party, for whom European integration has become (ofﬁ-
cially at least) an opportunity rather than a threat (Ichijo 2004: 43–58). In this
sense, European integration guaranteed and augmented Scottish sovereignty
in contrast to Westminster, which was seen by nationalists as a threat.
Conversely, political Englishness still remained obscured in the language of
the defence of British sovereignty. By being ‘for British democracy, not
Brussels bureaucracy’ (UKIP 1997), UKIP continued the conﬂation of
England and Britain through the defence of parliamentary sovereignty, its
history and traditions. It could do no other. For all the ways in which the
defence of parliamentary sovereignty had been augmented by popular
sovereignty, Eurosceptics in England still had to defend the UK’s sovereignty
against Europe while mounting a rearguard campaign against Scottish and
Welsh secessionists – which ultimately meant a defence of parliamentary
sovereignty. But defending sovereignty could be understood in different ways.
In the European elections of 2009, the British National Party (BNP) also won
two seats in England. BNP leader Nick Grifﬁn articulated a defensive English
nationalism when he claimed that his party was not racist, adding that:
There’s a huge amount of racism in this country; overwhelmingly it is directed towards
the indigenous British majority, which is one reason we’ve done so well in these
elections . . . the Labour Party, the Lib Dems and the Tories, by leaving the door to
Britain open, have forced people to turn to a party which speaks openly about the
problem of immigration. (BBC 2009)
In Powellite ways, the BNP merged anti-Europeanism and anti-immigration
in defence of sovereignty. The structural nature of the UK’s integration into
the EU forced English populists within the UKIP and the BNP to speak the
language of Britishness. It is thus the politics of sovereignty surrounding
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debates about European integration that help to explain the continuing
conﬂation of ‘England’ and ‘Britain’ among groups that we might otherwise
expect to articulate contemporary English nationalism.
How this might play out in British politics remains to be seen. The
Conservative Party has advocated referenda on two European issues in the
last decade: the Euro and the Lisbon Treaty. This invocation of popular
sovereignty is unusual for a party so committed to defending parliamentary
sovereignty. But in promising a No vote on Lisbon, the Conservative Party
was able to draw on a signiﬁcant stream of English popular nationalism
the nostalgic sentiment of September 2009 that saw Vera Lynn top the
charts might become an important political force with the ability to impact on
the process of European integration in very signiﬁcant ways.
Conclusion
The links between Euroscepticism and English nationalism are especially
signiﬁcant for several reasons. The ﬁrst is that debates about the UK’s
accession to the EEC and its continuing level of involvement in the process
of European integration focus attention on the role of sovereignty –
particularly parliamentary sovereignty – as a central element in English
nationalism. Furthermore, the somewhat esoteric doctrines, ideas and
conventions surrounding parliamentary sovereignty have been given a pop-
ular dimension through the Eurosceptic promotion of referenda on this
issue, thus beginning the process whereby parliamentary sovereignty was
merged with – and to some extent even superseded by – popular sovereignty.
Added to this during the 1980s was the notion of the sovereignty of
the individual (as an economic being), seeking freedom in the face of
state bureaucracy. And although Euroscepticism can demonstrate support
throughout the UK, the differing strategies and polices of nationalist parties
towards Europe mean that Euroscepticism ﬁnds its most comfortable home
in England. Additionally, understandings of the past and the popular defence
of parliament’s sovereignty feed into each other and reinforce each other.
The result is that Euroscpeticism is in all but name English nationalism, but
it is an English nationalism that still characteristically speaks the language
of Britishness.
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